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ABSTRACT
SCAR - SCATTER, CONCEAL AND RECOVER
Bryan Mills, M.S.
University of Pittsburgh, 2007
This thesis describes a secure and reliable method for storing data in a distributed hash table (DHT) that
leverages the inherent properties of the DHT to provide a secure storage substrate. The framework presented
is referred to as “Scatter, Conceal, and Recover” (SCAR). The standard method of securing data in a DHT
is to encrypt the data using symmetrical encryption before storing it in the network. SCAR provides this
level of security, but also prevents any known cryptoanalysis from being performed. It does this by breaking
the data into smaller blocks and scattering these blocks throughout the DHT. Hence, SCAR prevents any
unauthorized user from obtaining the entire encrypted data block. SCAR uses hash chains to determine the
storage locations for the data blocks within the DHT. To ensure storage availability, SCAR uses an erasure
coding scheme to provide full data recovery given only partial block recovery.
This thesis presents the details of SCAR. First, the framework, related protocols, and mechanisms are de-
scribed. Second, a prototype implementation is presented showing the feasibility of SCAR. Third, analytical
models are discussed that characterize SCAR’s behavior, the models are then validated using experimental
results. Lastly, the models are analyzed to further understand the tradeoff between data security and data
availability. The exploration of this tradeoff leads to the conclusion that SCAR can effectively balance this
tradeoff when the nodes of the network are “sufficiently” available.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND GOALS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Information is more accessible today than it has ever been in the history of mankind. Increasingly, we see
libraries of information being digitized and replicated, providing knowledge availability beyond anything
our previous generation could have envisioned. Modern communication is the great enabler in knowledge
access. From the advent of the telegraph to the immense throughput of a modern network, the primary goal
was to connect people to information. Just as the printing press made books available, distributed storage has
made information available. We have come to expect that any information can be accessed from anywhere
at anytime. In addition, we want to have easy access to our information, but much of this information is
private and should be not be accessible to other users. This struggle between accessibility and security is a
central theme in the modern world.
How can we provide a user with highly available information, and at the same time ensure the security
of their private data? Current solutions to this challenge fall short of this stated goal, as they often rely on
central authorities reducing accessibility and availability in order to achieve security. To fully address this
shortcoming, one must integrate several technologies.
The Internet can be viewed as a distributed storage facility that provides access to a bewilderingly variety
of documents and services. However, due to its scale and decentralized nature, the Internet has evolved into
a chaotic repository of all types of information, making it difficult for its users to locate resources of interest
to them. Recently, the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) overlay technologies have emerged to leverage resource discovery
and sharing on the Internet [29, 21, 26, 31].
Peer-to-peer networks allow large-scale deployment of a self-evolving infrastructure in an ad-hoc fash-
ion, without the need for centralized management or control. The ease of deployment of peer-to-peer overlay
infrastructure enables the development of a new class of applications that can effectively and strategically
provide services over the Internet. Distributed storage is a service often synonymous with peer-to-peer
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networks. The common approach to distributed storage is through the use of a distributed hash table (DHT).
A DHT provides its users with the ability to store data at and retrieve data from peers within the network.
The data is retrieved by querying the DHT for the data stored using a key value, which is specified when the
data is stored. Like a hash table, the key values are generated by using a hash function. In the distributed
hash table, each peer is assigned ownership for a given key space that is typically a range of possible hash
values. As an example, consider storing a file in the DHT. It is likely that the key would be the hash value
of the filename. The file is then inserted into the DHT based on this key; the peer with ownership of the key
space is responsible for storing and managing access to the file. To retrieve the file, a query with the inserted
key is made to the DHT. The responsible peer responds with the key associated file.
The DHT provides a mechanism for distributed storage; however, it does not satisfactorily solve the
problem of data availability. While the DHT provides a way of storing data, there is no guarantee that the
node responsible for the stored data will be available when data is requested. To provide availability in the
DHT, the implementor can either replicate data at different nodes or encode the data across multiple nodes
such that the data can be re-assembled despite the unavailability of some nodes. Data availability is an
essential feature of distributed storage, but in addition data security must be considered.
The security of data being stored in the DHT has not been addressed adequately by the research commu-
nity. Common approaches to data security in DHT-based peer-to-peer networks make the assumption that
data encryption is sufficient to ensure data security. While encryption provides some level of security, this
is not a complete solution. Encryption does not prevent an attacker from running brute force cryptoanalysis
tools to gain access to the data. This becomes even more apparent in systems designed to provide long term
storage, such as Oceanstore [16]. In these systems, given enough time any encryption could be broken.
Other data security solutions rely upon a central access authority to grant permission to authorized
users. This solution violates the core properties of the peer-to-peer framework which seeks to provide a
fully distributed storage system. Additionally, this suffers from a single point of failure. One solution to
address this shortcoming would be to replicate access authorities. This however, suffers from single point
of attack. For example, by comprising any one of the multiple authorities the data then becomes available
to the attacker. Another major concern stems from the fact that a given data object is typically stored as a
whole within a single node. Consequently, while the data may be inaccessible to the attacker directly, being
physically located within a single node exposes it to a single point of attack. Any system that relies on
central authorities or stores data within a single node suffers from a single point of attack.
The goal of this research is to address the aforementioned issues and provide a uniform framework
that provides secure, reliable, and highly available distributed storage using peer-to-peer technologies. This
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work was driven by the need to store user’s private information in a distributed storage system. This thesis
describes the problems faced while trying to build such a system, and presents a framework which overcomes
these problems. This framework is referred to as scatter, conceal, and recover (SCAR). A prototype will be
developed to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed framework.
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Computer users are becoming increasingly more mobile, and require access to their information from a
variety of locations. This has driven researchers and companies to build large distributed globally available
storage. Each of these systems rely upon a dedicated infrastructure and are typically under the control of a
single entity. The desire to create a fully decentralized system motivated the establishment of peer-to-peer
networks. These networks provide a framework that gives users the ability to access data from anywhere
and no longer requires a dedicated infrastructure nor does it require a central organization to provide this
service.
Peer-to-peer networks rely upon multiple un-trusted entities that all participate to provide distributed
storage. These peers are not required to meet any availability or reliability requirements. This means the
storage facility itself is not reliable, available, or secure. Many researchers have investigated how to increase
the reliability and availability of the data being stored, but data security has not received adequate attention.
How can peer-to-peer networks establish data security while the storage medium itself relies upon multiple
un-trusted entities? Can a secure peer-to-peer storage system be built that does not rely upon a central
authority? If building such a system is possible, can the system meet its required availability and reliability
requirements? The goal of this thesis is to gain better understanding of issues relevant to these questions
and design a framework to enable efficient and secure access to data stored within a DHT-based peer-to-peer
network.
1.3 SCAR’S CONTRIBUTION
A main contribution of this thesis is a novel way of securing data in an un-trusted distributed storage system
that does not rely on central authorities or complex cryptography. The idea of securely scattering data
across multiple un-trusted nodes while maintaining high data availability and reliability is unique in itself.
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This thesis also provides an implementation of the framework and details the implementation solutions.
Furthermore, this thesis provides analytical models that describe the security and availability of data being
stored using SCAR. These models are then used to study the inherent tradeoffs between data security and
availability and show how SCAR attempts to balance these competing goals.
The SCAR system was designed to meet the following goals:
• Provide data availability that is at least as good as that provided by any DHT implementation.
• Provide a higher level of security than that provided by data encryption.
• Maintain independence with respect to the underlying distributed storage system.
To achieve these goals, SCAR efficiently combines erasure coding and hash chaining to increase both
availability and security. Erasure coding enables SCAR to provide high availability by splitting data into
multiple pieces such that only a fraction of these pieces are required to assemble the original data. Hash
chaining provides a way to deterministically conceal the data, by scattering the pieces over randomly se-
lected peers. Concealing the location of the data pieces makes it extremely difficult for an attacker to
gain access to enough information to reassemble the original data. As such, cryptoanalysis is no longer
achievable, thereby increasing the security of the stored data.This combination creates an apparent random
distribution of the data while providing an authorized user a deterministic way of gathering the data. SCAR
can be adapted to any DHT implementation since hash chains can be produced using any hash function. This
is an elegant solution to the difficult problem of providing highly available and secure distributed storage.
1.4 METHODOLOGY
The basic tenet of SCAR’s design is to balance data security and availability. The intersection of peer-to-
peer networks, erasure coding, and “trackable randomness” was used to achieve the goals of the system.
SCAR does not modify the peer-to-peer structure, but simply acts as a DHT user. Erasure coding was used
to provide data availability and adapted for use within a DHT structure. The system had to track an apparent
random process, this required several simulations resulting in the use of hash chains. The final step was to
combine these technologies into a unified system.
During the design phase, availability and security models were developed to determine if the design was
beneficial. Experiments were then conducted to determine if our models accurately described the system
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behavior. These experiments focused on how erasure encoding and hash chaining performed within the
peer-to-peer network.
Once the design was defined, a prototype was developed that implemented the entire system and allowed
for more testing. The prototype went is written in Python and uses the OpenDHT [23] interface.
1.5 SUMMARY
The need for highly available private data has prompted the development of a framework that utilizes DHT’s
to provide a secure distributed storage system. The framework glues together three different technologies,
peer-to-peer networks, erasure coding, and hash chains, to create an elegant and unique solution. An im-
plementation of this framework was built and the availability and security tradeoffs were analyzed. This
implementation is then provided as a library that an application developer can use to provide secure dis-
tributed storage.
In chapter 2, we provide a background on peer-to-peer technologies. In chapter 3, we present the design
of SCAR and provide the details of the system. In chapter 4, we describe the models used in the analysis of
SCAR. We provide implementation details in section 5.1. We then present various experiments conducted
using SCAR in section 5.2. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in chapter 6
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2.0 RELATED WORK
2.1 PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS
A peer-to-peer network enables two or more peers to share access to resources without requiring a separate
centralized management authority. Each peer has some capability that it then provides to other peers in the
network. Collectively the peers can provide a variety of services, including routing and storage. While the
deployment of peer-to-peer network services is relatively new, the concept of peer-to-peer has been around
since the early days of computing. Examples of these peer-to-peer applications include email and irc servers.
These servers act as peers to one another, each with a common goal of providing services to the network.
Often modern peer-to-peer networks are described by their communication behaviors, specifically how
messages are routed within the network. Peers are connected to one another using some physical network.
When a peer discovers another peer, there is said to be a direct connection between those peers. Relying
upon each other, peers can route messages within the network using multi-hop routing. This leads to what
is known as a peer-to-peer overlay network; these networks are classified into un-structured and structured
networks.
Un-structured networks allow nodes to be located anywhere, and impose few or no rules about how the
nodes are connected. A node can create connections to other nodes arbitrarily, creating a random graph.
Because nodes are unaware of the structure, queries are executed by flooding the request to every node in
the network. When the query arrives at a node it first determines if it can answer the query, and if so it replies
to the requesting node. The node then forwards the query to all other directly connected nodes. Because
un-structured networks rely on flooding, query execution is slow and might be incomplete. Queries may
not complete if the network becomes disconnected or if the query takes too long causing a query timeout.
Popular un-structured networks are Napster, Gnutella [1], and KaZaA [2].
Structured peer-to-peer networks are designed to overcome the problems of un-structured networks.
Structured networks maintain a distributed hash table (DHT), which is used for both data queries and net-
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work routing. Each peer is responsible for managing a given part of the network, corresponding to a range of
hash values. Any request for data in this hash range is handled by the node responsible for that hash value.
This idea stems from the influential paper by Karger et al. on consistent hashing and web caching [15].
Researchers have explored various designs for DHT’s, but the fundamental idea of using a hash function to
distribute data and nodes throughout the network has changed very little. While there are several different
structured peer-to-peer networks, such as Chord [29], CAN [21], and Pastry [26], each of these networks
follow the same general architecture. They each divide the hash space into a range of values that are assigned
to participating nodes. Then data is mapped to a single hash value which is used to determine the node that
is responsible for that data.
Most structured overlay networks separate the functions of routing information from the actual data
storage. For example when a query is submitted to the DHT the network must first determine which node
should answer the query, this process is known as routing. Routing messages to responsible nodes have
applications outside of a DHT, as a result, the routing functions are usually built independently of the DHT.
A DHT, combined with routing functions creates a distributed data storage. The typical interface [9] for the
DHT is put and get functions that allow the storage and retrieval of data within the network. Data requests
are routed to the responsible node using the routing layer, and the data storage is handled independently by
each node.
Researchers have used DHT’s as an underlying architecture to provide complete filesystems or object
repositories. Systems such as the Cooperative File System (CFS) [10], uses Chord’s DHT structure to
manage a filesystem. Several other DHT based filesystems [6,19] have sought to solve issues such as meta-
data storage, mutable storage, availability, and latency issues. Additionally, RAMA [18] a distributed file
system that pre-dates DHT’s, also uses a hash function to pseudo-randomly store filesystem data blocks.
These systems assume that security would be handled by a central authority or data encryption. SCAR can
be used to address these shortcomings as it provides the basis to implement a system that is secure and truly
decentralized.
SCAR assumes a structured peer-to-peer network, and uses the associated DHT to provide distributed
data storage. SCAR does not depend on any particular DHT implementation, but assumes that a put/get
interface is available. SCAR’s contribution is to design a framework to securely and reliably store data
using the underlying DHT of the peer-to-peer network. In the rest of this section, we will discuss peer-to-
peer design issues, including the current state of the art DHT security and availability.
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2.1.1 DHT Security
A DHT relies upon two different components, peer-to-peer infrastructure and the storage facilities. The
underling peer-to-peer infrastructure, determines the routing and address space responsibilities to be per-
formed by each peer node. The second component is the storage service provided by each node, managing
its assigned address space. The combination of these two components provides a distributed data storage
within the peer-to-peer network, referred to as a DHT. Because the DHT involves both of these components,
security of data within the DHT must consider both components.
The responsibility of nodes to manage their allocated address space and perform routing operations is
assigned when a node joins the peer-to-peer network. This assignment can easily be achieved if all nodes
were trusted, as it does not raise security risks. However, if the nodes joining the network are malicious,
the routing and space management assignment become more difficult [5, 28]. The ability of nodes to join
and then leave the network, referred to as node churn [22], can lead to a potential security attack, known as
the join/leave attack. Such an attack occurs when nodes rapidly join and then leave the network, causing
reassignment of the address space to each node. This rapid oscillation can lead to the collapse of the network.
Another class of attacks, known as Sybil attacks [12], occur when one malicious user is controlling multiple
nodes. If an attacker controls multiple nodes within the network then the attacker might be able to interfere
with network routing, by dropping or mis-routing messages. Routing attacks, such as Sybil attacks, can
occur because the network depends on all of the nodes for routing, so even a single malicious node can
cause routing to fail. In addition, denial of service attacks are easily carried out by flooding the network
with messages addressed to the same node. Many of these attacks become very hard to guard against and
only pragmatic solutions exist that limit, but not completely disband, the threat. There have been several
peer-to-peer frameworks developed to address these security issues [11, 3, 4].
Maintaining the DHT structure depends upon the reliability of the underlying peer-to-peer infrastructure;
as a result, the security of the infrastructure components are a requirement for a secure DHT. However, data
correctness and protection are issues that must be handled by the storage facilities. Data correctness is
the ability to both ensure and verify that data retrieved from the DHT is the same as the data inserted.
Fortunately, data correctness can be verified using various cryptographic techniques. Data protection is the
requirement that stored data can only be accessed by authorized users. Data protection becomes a problem
when untrusted nodes are made responsible for storing data that needs to be protected.
While there has been significant work in the area of peer-to-peer security, data protection in the DHT
has been largely ignored. The assumption has been that if the data protection is needed, it will be protected
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before insertion into the DHT. Typically this would involve the encryption of the data prior to insertion it
into the DHT. This solution might not be adequate because attackers can perform cryptoanalysis to break
the encryption. Such an attack can easily be carried out because all encrypted data is available to everyone
in the DHT, including the attacker. Other solutions to this problem introduce a central authority that is used
for authentication and authorization. A central authority imposes design constraints that are hard to securely
implement and manage over time. Additionally, these approaches force a distributed system to rely upon a
central service.
SCAR provides a data protection solution that is more secure than encrypting data, and does so without
the use of a central authority. SCAR conceals data in the DHT using a password seeded hash chain to
deterministically scatter data and prevent unauthorized users from locating the stored data.
2.2 DHT AVAILABILITY
The ability to secure data in the DHT does not guarantee that data will be available when requested. Data
availability is a challenge because data is stored at nodes that may join or leave the network at anytime.
This fluctuation in node availability is referred to as node churn, and has been the focus of research both for
DHT-based [22] and other types of peer-to-peer networks. In addition to node churn, data availability is also
concerned with malicious nodes not providing storage that they have agreed to provide, therefore making
data unavailable.
The common solution to the node churn problem is to replicate the data so that when retrieving data,
there are several available location for finding it. This solution, while simple, is not efficient in recovery
time or storage requirements. Replication may cause recovery time to become excessive as it relies on a
timeout mechanism to determine if nodes have failed. Because of these shortcomings one could use erasure
coding to encode the data into multiple pieces such that only a fraction of the pieces is required to fully
recover the data. Weathersppon and Kubiatowicz present the argument for using erasure codes instead
of replication [30]. SCAR uses Rabin’s Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) [20], which is also used
by Freenet [7] and Mnemosyne [14]. Erasure coding is much harder to implement and can cause greater
maintenance overhead [25]. All DHT implementations using erasure coding store data pieces at easily
predictable locations, such as neighboring nodes or node ancestors. These locations are known to all users
of the network and therefore provide no additional security. However, SCAR conceals the storage locations
from everyone but authorized users, thereby providing greater data security.
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Also related to availability is the fact that malicious nodes might not keep the data they have been
requested to store. This problem has been addressed with random data challenges [8] to nodes in the system
to verify they are storing the data they claim to have stored. This checking system is able to detect malicious
nodes and enforce counter measures, such as high levels of replication or ejection of that node from the
network.
2.3 DATA RELIABILITY
Reliability of data refers to the fact that the data that is retrieved should be identical to the data that was
stored. For example, the data could have been corrupted while in the storage system or might have been
modified by a malicious user, in either case the data was not reliably stored. This differs from availability
because a storage system that is available 100% of the time but always produces the wrong data is available
but not reliable. Most DHT’s address the problem of data reliability by using a cryptographic message digest,
such as a MD5 or SHA-1 checksum. This technique allows the user to detect data corruption because upon
retrieval the stored checksum can be compared with the checksum of the retrieved data. If a malicious user
is trying to corrupt the stored data this technique fails because the malicious user could update the stored
checksum. This problem is addressed using digital signatures [14] which allows users to detect the corrupted
checksum.
2.4 HASH CHAINING
Hash chains have their roots in providing user authentication [13] and secure micropayments [24]. To use
hash chains for authentication, a series of passwords are calculated from a single password. Each login
attempt requires the next password in the series. To create this series, the root password is hashed repeatedly
creating unique passwords. SCAR uses this technique to generate storage locations for the pieces of data
to be stored in the DHT. Because the hash chain is seeded with a secret password only users with that
password can determine the storage locations. This property is what allows authorized users to track an
apparent random distribution of data pieces.
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3.0 SCATTER, CONCEAL AND RECOVER (SCAR) DESIGN
The main tenet of SCAR is based on the observation that it is harder to break encrypted information if
the attacker has no way of obtaining the encrypted data. SCAR achieves this using a simple, yet powerful
concept of concealment through random distribution. The goal is to break data into pieces and randomly
distribute the data throughout the network so that only authorized users can locate the pieces and recover
the original data. Hence, our approach is to scatter data such that its locations are concealed, and ensure that
only authorized users can recover the data that was stored.
A system to randomly distribute data faces several crucial design challenges. First, how to track the
untrackable, meaning how can we randomly distribute data so that the attacker can not find it, but yet make
the data easily accessible to authorized users? Second, how do we embed such a system within the context
of a DHT? Also, how can we ensure high availability in the face of node failures and potentially high
node churn? Finally, how can we build a system that provides a simple interface such that the scattering,
concealing, and recovering data is transparent to the user of the system?
3.1 DATA SCATTERING
Many structured DHT’s apply a hash function to some unique node values (such as network address) to
determine the node’s location within the peer-to-peer network. The hash function not only guarantees a
random node distribution but is also deterministic. Therefore, using a hash function to generate random
but also reproducible storage locations was adopted in SCAR. The need to have storage locations unknown
to an attacker prompted the idea to seed the hash function with a secret password to produce the storage
location. This approach only leads to one storage location; hiding the data in one location, however, this
does not ensure the same level of security as breaking the data into many pieces and hiding them in multiple
locations. To generate multiple storage locations, SCAR uses the concept of hash chaining [13]. Based
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on this concept, SCAR uses a given hash value and repeatedly runs the hash function to generate multiple
random locations. The use of hash functions to generate storage locations, makes a DHT a natural fit for
SCAR, as DHT storage locations are already defined as a hash value.
To address the problem of availability, SCAR makes use of the erasure encoding schema called informa-
tion dispersal algorithm (IDA) [20]. IDA splits a block of data into multiple pieces such that only a fraction
of those generated pieces are needed for data recovery. Formally, IDA generates f pieces of data such that
only k pieces are needed for recovery, such that k < f .
Information dispersal algorithm (IDA) was chosen because of its ability to produce f distinct pieces of
data from a data block of any size. In contract, other erasure codes such as Reed-Solomon only produce
a small set of fragments for a given block size. Other codes, such as Tornado, are focused on reducing
computation speed and do not guarantee distinct pieces.
Upon breaking the original data into multiple pieces using erasure coding, SCAR must scatter these
pieces throughout the DHT. This is required for SCAR to meet security and high data availability as specified
in it’s design goals. As nodes leave, SCAR is still able to recover the stored data, since not all data pieces
are required to recover the original data.
3.2 DATA STORAGE INTERFACE
Users of a distributed storage system should not be concerned about how their data is stored. Furthermore,
this calls for a simple user interface to store and recover data. Driven by this requirement, SCAR provides
support for a simple save and load (put/get) interface, which relieves the user from the burden of dealing
with how their data is stored in the network. To meet it’s design goals, SCAR automatically selects the
system parameters to achieve the security and availability requirements.
SCAR first adds header information to the raw data, and then it breaks the data into a number of pieces
called storable units. Each of these storable units are then placed into individual storage bins that contain
additional header information used during the recovery process. To determine the storage location of each
storage bin, a hash chain is started using the name of the data, a password, and the version number of the
data. The hash chain is then produced by re-hashing the previous hash value along with the secret password.
Each hash value produced by this hash chain becomes a series of storage locations for these storage bins.
See Figure 1 for a overview of the encoding process. To recover the data, the user must provide the name of
the data, a password, and a version number that SCAR will use to re-generate the hash chain, thus obtaining
12
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Figure 1: Overview of SCAR’s Encoding Process
the storage locations.
3.3 PACKAGING THE RAW DATA
As can be seen in Figure 1 (a), there is some pre-processing that must occur before the raw data can be
encoded into its storable units. Pre-processing will ensure that the data is large enough for encoding, perform
encryption, and add a header for data verification upon recovery.
Since the encoding process divides the raw data into smaller pieces, we need to first make sure the raw
data is of sufficient size to support this process. If the data is smaller than predefined size, then we need to
pad the data making it that size. When padding the data, we want to require that all of the data, including the
padding, is required for data recovery. To obtain this property, SCAR uses secret sharing techniques [27] to
generate the padding.
Assume we need at least 100 bytes to encode and we have raw data of only 25 bytes. SCAR would
generate three more 25 byte random pieces of data. The last piece of data would be the XOR of each of the
random pieces and the original data. By stringing each of these generated pieces of data together, we will
have the desired 100 bytes of data. To recover the original data, one must identify each generated piece of
data and XOR each piece together. The result of this operation is the original data. Every generated piece is
needed to recover the original data, meaning we need all 100 bytes to recover the 25 bytes of original data.
After we are assured the raw data is large enough, we construct a fixed size header depicted in Figure 2.
After the header is added the data is encrypted using symmetrical encryption.
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file size (64)
SHA-1 Hash (40) padding size (10)
...
encrypted data
...
Figure 2: Raw Data Header, numbers represent size in bytes
3.4 ENCODING DATA INTO STORABLE UNITS
Once we have the data ready for storage, SCAR must split the data into multiple pieces and encode the data
to ensure data availability, as can be seen in Figure 1 (b). To do this, SCAR implements Rabin’s Information
Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) [20] to encode the data into storable units. This encoding produces f storable
units and allows full data recovery with only k recovered units, where k≤ f . Values for f and k are dependent
upon the availability requirements for the data being encoded. Chapter 4 discusses the selection of values
for k and f based upon tradeoffs between availability and security. Once values of f and k are chosen, we
execute IDA on the pre-processed raw data. Details on how our IDA implementation works can be found in
the next section. Each piece that is generated from this encoding process is unique and of the same size.
3.4.1 IDA Explained
The main concept behind IDA is to split a given data object into f different pieces such that only k pieces
are required for regenerating the original data object, k ≤ f . To achieve this property, IDA uses principles
of matrix multiplication to build a transform from k original pieces of data into f pieces of encoded data.
The transform is built using a linearly independent matrix so that the inverse of that transform matrix is
guaranteed to exist. Then given any k pieces of the encoded data and the inverse transform, it is possible to
regenerate the original data.
Let the original data be represented as a series of bytes of the form D=b1,b2,b3...bn. Create a matrix
of these bytes by slicing the data into n/k pieces and stacking them on top of one another. The next step
is to generate the transform matrix of n/k columns and f rows. As mentioned earlier, this matrix must be
linearly independent, meaning that none of the rows can be generated by linear manipulation of another row
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in the matrix. This guarantees that the inverse matrix exists, allowing the reversal of matrix multiplication.
There are several ways to generate this transform matrix. SCAR uses a simple algorithm and is guaranteed
to generate the same transform matrix given the values of f , k, and n. By using the same transform matrix
each time for these given values, the transform matrix does not have to be encoded within the storage bins.
Once we have the transform matrix, the original data matrix and the transform matrix are multiplied to-
gether. This will generate a new matrix with n/k columns and f rows, with each of these rows corresponding
to one of f encoded pieces of data.
To recover the data given any k pieces of the encoded data, it is required that one knows the index of
the k pieces within the context of all f encoded pieces. Then knowing the order of the encoded pieces, the
decoder must also have the rows corresponding to this same index within the original transform matrix. As
mentioned earlier, SCAR uses the same transform matrix for all given values of f , k, and n. The order of the
recovered k pieces is also known to SCAR because the hash chain used to generate the storage locations are
known. Once the proper subset of the transform matrix is known, the recovery process must generate the
inverse transform. The recovered encoded data is then multiplied by the inverse transform matrix producing
the original data.
One problem arises from the fact that the f encoded pieces might be larger than the original k pieces.
To resolve this problem, we perform all math within a finite field. Specifically, this transform process uses
a prime finite field, also known as a Galois field. Essentially, we perform all math modulo a prime number.
This forces all of the cells in the encoded matrix to be less than the prime number. In our implementation
we want all cells to be 1 byte, so we choose the prime number 257. This is described in detail in the next
section.
3.4.2 Finite Field Arithmetic
A problem with the schema described above is that each of the f encoded pieces will not be the same size as
an original k piece. This is because each cell in the original data matrix represented 1 byte, but because of the
transform, the cells in the encoded matrix might be larger than 1 byte. This is due to repeated mathematical
operations caused by the matrix manipulations resulting in numbers that might be greater than those input.
The desired output is a series of bytes, and to accomplish this, all arithmetic operations must be bounded
by the size of a byte. Because of this requirement, all arithmetic operations are performed using finite field
arithmetic.
Finite field arithmetic is different than standard arithmetic. The finite field is a limited list of numbers
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and all arithmetic operations result in a number in that finite list. By using finite arithmetic during all
mathematical operations, we can be assured that the output from IDA will never exceed the size of the input.
In particular, IDA uses a prime finite field, also called a Galois field (GF). A prime field is an example of
a special type of field known as a ring in which mathematical operations are closed under that same field.
Prime fields are denoted GF(p), where p is a prime number and the field consists of the set of integers from
0 to p− 1. An extension field is denoted GF(pr), where p is a prime number and r > 1. Prime fields and
extension fields are both closed under arithmetic operations.
To make finite field operations efficient on a computer, let p = 2, so that mathematics can be achieved
using bit operations. For implementation purposes we let r = 8, which makes the field size 256, allowing the
computations to always produce a byte size integer. We need to define addition, subtraction, multiplication,
and division in order to perform the matrix operations needed for IDA.
Addition and subtraction are defined as the XOR of the two values. Notice that properties of adding and
subtracting still hold, but all applications of the operation always result in a value inside the finite field.
Multiplication is based on primitive polynomials. These are polynomials that cannot be expressed as the
product of any two elements within the finite field. A primitive polynomial is also called an irreducible poly-
nomial because it cannot be reduced by elements within the finite field. As an example, consider GF(pr),
where p = 2 and r = 8, one irreducible polynomial is x8 + x4 + x3 + x2 +1, which can be represented by the
bit string 100011101, where the nth bit location corresponds the nth polynomial location. Multiplication is
then defined as the polynomial multiplication of the two polynomials corresponding to the two values being
multiplied modulo a primitive polynomial for that finite field.
By defining the log function within the context of the prime field, multiplication and division can be
simplified to addition and subtraction, reducing them to bit operations. The definition of log is based on
the property that for any prime field, there exists an element α that belongs to the finite field, and for every
element n in the finite field, there exists a value i such that αi = n. We can then define log(αi) = i. With
this definition, we can re-define multiplication as x∗ y = α(log(x)+log(y))mod(q−1) , where q = pr. Armed with
this definition, we can define the inverse within the finite field as 1/x = αq−1−log(x), where q = pr. Using
multiplication by the inverse element, we can define division within the finite field. In GF(28) we can define
α = 2, for all of these operations [17].
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3.4.3 An IDA Example
All matrix operations must be performed using the arithmetic operations defined in the previous section.
As an example, let p = 2 and r = 3, which defines a finite field of size 23 = 8. Further, assume that the
IDA parameters are k = 3 and f = 5. This means we need a linearly independent transform matrix of size
3× 5 (k× f ). An algorithm to generate such a matrix is discussed in Chapter 5.1. Notice, however, the
process used to generate a encoding matrix is not important, as long as the matrix is linearly independent.
The matrix generated by the proposed algorithm is:


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
4 3 6
1 1 1


Let’s assume the data we want to encode is defined by the matrix:


3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2
4 3 6 5 0 7 2 1
5 6 3 4 1 2 7 0


Encoding the data is done by multiplying the transformation matrix by the data matrix resulting in f
encoded pieces of data. The size of each encoded data piece will not exceed the size of the input data piece
because all math is done within the finite field.


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
4 3 6
1 1 1


×


3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2
4 3 6 5 0 7 2 1
5 6 3 4 1 2 7 0

=


3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2
4 3 6 5 0 7 2 1
5 6 3 4 1 2 7 0
3 1 2 4 7 5 6 0
2 1 0 7 6 5 4 3


If we only retrieve data pieces number 3, 4, and 2, then to recover the original data, we must build another
transform matrix, called the decoding matrix, using the originally created transform matrix. As described
previously, this transform matrix is made up of the rows of the original transform matrix corresponding to
the data pieces gathered (rows 3, 4, 2). The inverse of this constructed matrix is then multiplied by the
recovered data to produce the original data.
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D =


1 1 1
4 3 6
0 0 1


D−1 =


7 4 2
6 4 3
0 0 1




7 4 2
6 4 3
0 0 1

×


2 1 0 7 6 5 4 3
3 1 2 4 7 5 6 0
5 6 3 4 1 2 7 0

=


3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2
4 3 6 5 0 7 2 1
5 6 3 4 1 2 7 0


3.5 PACKING THE STORAGE BINS
Each of the f storable units need to packed into storage bins before storing them in the DHT. This process
adds header information (see Figure 3) that will allow us to verify the data during the recovery process. The
header contains the hash of the concatenation of the previous storage location, the next storage location, and
the user’s secret password. This is critical during the recovery process because it allows SCAR to identify
hash collisions. By including the password into the seed value of the hash, we ensure that an attacker could
not determine the previous or next storage location in the hash chain. This piece of the header is not known
until the storage bin is inserted into the DHT. SCAR also adds a checksum of the storable unit data to allow
the detection of data errors during recovery before decoding the pieces.
checksum of bin contents (40)
hash(previous and next storage location and password) (40)
Figure 3: Storage Bin Header, numbers represent size in bytes
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3.6 SCATTERING THE STORAGE BINS
We now have a series of storage bins ready for placement into the DHT. SCAR relies upon a hash chain
seeded by a password to determine the storage locations within the DHT, refer to Figure 1 (c). The password
is known only to those with authorized access to the data being stored. Let the locations produced be called
L0, L1, L2, ..., Ln, where L0 is used as a base for the hash generation. As such, L0 does not represent an
actual storage location. The process to produce the locations is depicted in Figure 4.
L0 = hash(cat(password, object id, revision number))
L1 = hash(cat(L0, password, object id, revision number))
L2 = hash(cat(L1, password, object id, revision number))
Ln = hash(cat(Ln−1, password, object id, revision number))
Figure 4: Storage Location Generation. Where cat is the string concatenation of all arguments.
The chain is seeded with three pieces of information: a name identifying the data object (object id), a
revision number, and a secret password. This information is hashed, and the resulting value is then hashed
again with the same seeding information (data name, revision, and password), to produce the first storage
location (see Figure 4). The result of the previous hash, combined with the original seeding values, is then
used to generate the next storage location. This hash chaining is continued until all the units have been
assigned a storage location.
A closer look at the above process reveals that the recursive location procedure may result in storage
location collisions. To prevent collisions, a request is made to determine if another bin has been previously
stored at that location before inserting the storage bin. If so, the algorithm skips that value in the hash chain
and attempts to use the next value in the chain. This process is continued until a vacant location in the DHT
is found. During the recovery process, the storage bin header is used to determine when such a collision has
occurred.
If a collision occurs while trying to store the first unit, SCAR checks to make sure that the hash of the
reference name, revision number, and password does not match that of the existing block. If it does, then
the recovery process would not be able to detect the error and would recover the wrong data. In this case,
we must return an error to the user and ask them to select a different object identifier, revision, or password.
This special case is discussed in detail in section 3.8.
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As storage locations are determined, put requests can be issued to the DHT for each storage bin. This
process can be done in parallel, and therefore the time to perform an insert is bounded by the slowest time
to insert any one of the storage bins.
3.7 DATA RECOVERY
To recover data in SCAR, the user must provide a object identifier, revision number, and password. Once
these pieces of information are determined, SCAR generates the hash chain used to store the original data.
SCAR then issues get requests against the DHT to start recovering the storage bins. Each bin that is recov-
ered is verified by looking at the hash value of the previous and next storage locations. This ensures that the
data being recovered is in the correct sequence. If SCAR detects an error in this process, it assumes a hash
collision occurred and skips that storage location.
Similar to the storage process, the data recovery process can occur in parallel. As errors are detected,
storage bins recovered for one part of the sequence might be found to be a different part of the sequence, but
this can be resolved during the recovery process. Again, the recovery time is bounded by the slowest time
to recover one storage bin.
Once all the bins are recovered, they are assembled and decoded using the information dispersal algo-
rithm. Once the data is recovered, the raw data header is used to verify the contents of the entire data object.
Lastly, the raw data is decrypted producing the original data.
3.8 HASH COLLISION
There are two types of hash collisions that SCAR does not handle. The first occurs when the information
provided by the user (data name, revision, and password), is identical to that of another user. This problem
is detected by SCAR when it attempts to store the data, but simply returns a error stating the data already
exists. One solution is to add some user identifying information to the meta-data used to generate the storage
locations.
The second case occurs if two hash chains using different secret passwords converge to the same series
of values. This is very unlikely, but if it did occur, SCAR would again report an error during the insertion
phase and request the user to change the data name, revision, or password.
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3.9 IMMUTABLE UNITS
Most DHT’s implement their storage as immutable objects. To ensure compatibility with these DHT’s,
SCAR was design to handle immutable objects. To handle this objective SCAR adds a revision number as
part of the hash chain. Every time a new revision is stored using SCAR, the revision number is incremented
to the next available revision. This process can be hidden from the user by automatically querying the DHT
to determine highest available revision number. The process of determining the maximum revision number
requires that a single storage bin be retrieved to determine if that revision number already exists. It is worth
noting that although designed to handle immutable data stores, SCAR does not require them and could just
as easily operate with mutable storage.
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4.0 ANALYSIS
This section presents the models developed to describe the availability and security of data stored using
SCAR. These models are then used to analyze the inherent tradeoff between availability and security.
4.1 DATA AVAILABILITY MODEL
In SCAR, data availability is dependent upon the availability of nodes that are storing the data pieces. To
understand data availability, we first explore the availability of a single node. Having an availability model
of a single node, we can then develop a model that describes SCAR’s data availability. With this model, it
is possible to derive parameters for the information dispersal algorithm.
4.1.1 Node Availability
To model node availability we characterize users based on their behaviors in terms of:
• frequency of which they visit the network, and
• resulting time for each visit in the network.
Based on the above characterization, nodes alternate between two states: Online and Offline. When in
the online state, the node is available and therefore is able to provide peer-to-peer services. While offline,
however, the node is unavailable and can no longer assume its peer-to-peer responsibilities.
Notice that the reasons which drive a user to alternate between the online and offline states are only
relevant to SCAR to the extent that they expose different patterns of behaviors for different classes of users.
As such, SCAR is only concerned with the availability, or lack thereof, of the user. Consequently, node
availability in the SCAR framework can be modeled as an ON/OFF process, where the average duration
in the ON and OFF states are reflective of a particular pattern of behavior. The state diagram depicting
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the ON/OFF process is shown in Figure 5. At any given point in time, the node can be either available or
unavailable. To model this behavior, we define the following binary variable, which indicates if the node is
available at a given time t, as follows:
Si(t) =


1 if node i is available at time t
0 otherwise
     

 

  

Figure 5: State Diagram depicting ON/OFF model where α and β is the probability of going between ON
and OFF states respectively.
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Figure 6: Binary Variable (Si) over time.
The node’s availability is therefore defined as the probability that the value of Si(t) is 1. The availability
of a given node over time is illustrated in Figure 6.
Assuming that the nodes ON and OFF periods have a mean value, we can define the node’s asymptotic
availability using this binary variable. Because these ON and OFF cycles have a mean, they have an expected
value for the amount of time that the node will be ON or OFF. Let E[ONi] and E[OFFi] be the expected ON
and OFF time for node i respectively. Given this information, we can define Ai as the availability of node i.
Ai = lim
t→∞
Pr[Si(t) = 1] =
E[ONi]
E[ONi]+E[OFFi]
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The challenge is how to compute the values of E[ON] and E[OFF]. This requires the analysis of the
corresponding nodes behaviors. Assuming that the typical network users login to the network, perform some
work, then leave the network only to return at some later time, the nodes availability can be modeled based
on the user’s activities and behaviors. Under this assumption, the amount of time a node is ON during a
period of time is dependent upon the activity the user is performing. For example, if the user is downloading
textual files, they might be present for a duration of time proportional to the file transfer time. If they are
streaming a movie, however, they would remain in the network a longer periods of time. The OFF periods
are not characterized by the activity of the user but by the user’s typical behaviors. For example, a user
might login once a day and check for new files whereas another user might login every hour. Therefore,
the time a node spends in the ON state is driven by the user’s activity while the OFF state is determined by
the user’s profile. This shows that the distribution model used for the ON and OFF time should be modeled
using two separate distribution models.
Based on the above observation, one possible model would be to use an exponential distribution to model
the ON state and use a heavy tailed pareto distribution for the OFF state. This is based upon the assumption
that the ON state is driven by the user’s activities which will vary over time but have no particular pattern.
On the other hand, the OFF state is driven by the user’s behaviors and the longer a user is away from the
system the more likely it is that they will return. This would represent the case where a user logs into a
system, leaves, then returns at some point later in time.
While the choice of distributions are important for simulating the actual network behavior our model
does not rely on the model itself. Notice that the node’s availability, as defined previously, depends only
upon the expected ON and OFF time, not the distribution model. This allows us to simplify our analysis
by using distributions which have a mean value, allowing us to easily determine the expected ON and OFF
times.
4.1.2 Node Types
Based on the node availability model discussed previously, peer nodes are characterized based on the pa-
rameters of an ON/OFF process, namely the average duration of the ON and OFF periods. A closer look at
a typical users behavior in a peer-to-peer network suggests three classes of users which correspond to three
types of nodes: infrastructure, power, and peeper nodes.
Infrastructure nodes represent the core component of a peer-to-peer network. As such, these nodes are
expected to remain connected to the network, barring physical failure. Power nodes represent a class of
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nodes which are not dedicated resources, but remain connected to the network for extended periods of time.
Peepers, on the other hand, are short-lived visitors of the network who are driven by the need to perform a
“quick” task. Upon acquiring the needed resource or service, peeper nodes leave the network.
One may argue that a more refined categorization of the nodes may be more reflective of the diverse
behaviors of a peer-to-peer network. The three types of nodes defined previously, however, is sufficient to
characterize node availability in most frequently encountered scenarios in a typical peer-to-peer network.
This node classification is used in the SCAR framework to model node behavior.
Let E[ONc] and E[OFFc] be the mean ON and OFF times for each class c. Then, we can define a single
node’s average availability by summing over all possible classes and their respective availability multiplied
by the distribution of that node class.
¯A = ∑
c∈Classes
Pr[available|class = c]∗Pr[nclass = c] = ∑
c∈Classes
E[ONc]
E[ONc]+E[OFFc]
∗Pr[class = c]
Conversely, let the node’s average unavailability be defined as ¯U , which is the inverse of ¯A.
¯U = 1− ¯A
To determine the probability that a given node is in a particular class, the network is characterized by its
nodes class distribution. For example, the network might be composed of 50% infrastructure nodes, 30%
power nodes, and the remaining 20% are peepers. This allows us to vary the class distribution of our network
and see how this affects the average node availability. This also provides a simple model that can be used
to quickly classify nodes and calculate the networks average node availability. The network should monitor
its members and provide to its users the current expected node availability so that its users can better utilize
the network.
4.1.3 SCAR’s Data Availability
Availability of data within the DHT is expressed as a probability that the data stored in the DHT will be
available when requested. This probability is dependent upon the probability that a single node is available.
This model assumes that the availability of any node is independent of the availability of any other node.
Based upon the model of node availability described previously, the average network node un-availability
( ¯U ) is used to determine the actual data availability. The following is based upon the work described in [30].
Given the following definitions:
• k - number of fragments required,
• f - total number of fragments,
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• ¯U - average probability of node being unavailable see 4.1.1, and
• n - total number of nodes.
The probability that the original datum can be recovered is expressed as:
f−k
∑
i=0
(
¯U∗n
i
)((1− ¯U)∗n
f−i
)
(
n
f
)
In the above expression:
•
(
¯U∗n
i
)
represents the number of ways i fragments can be stored at the unavailable nodes.
•
((1− ¯U)∗n
f−i
)
represents the number of ways f − i fragments can be stored at the available nodes.
•
(
n
f
)
represents the number of ways f fragments can be stored in the n network nodes.
Multiplying the top two terms represents the total number of ways we could arrange the f fragments
given that i fragments are unavailable. The last term is a normalization factor. Dividing the equation by
this term produces the probability of i fragments being unavailable and the remaining f − i fragments being
available. Summing these probabilities over the number of fragments that could be lost, still allowing full
data recovery, represents the data availability of SCAR.
The problem with this model is that it depends upon the number of nodes in the network. This is
problematic because when we are determining values of f and k, the number of nodes in the network may
be unknown. As a result the following model is used:
f
∑
i=k
( f
i
)
(1− ¯U)i( ¯U) f−i
As n increases, the model converges to the previously stated model, as depicted in Figure 7. Once the
total number of nodes, n, becomes about 10 times larger than the number of fragments, f , the two models
are virtually identical. This model was also used in [25].
An important observation is that using erasure encoding to reliably store data is viable only when the
node’s availability is sufficiently high. Looking at Figure 8, it is obvious that if the node’s availability is
less than 80%, then replication exhibits higher data availability than erasure coding based schemes. This
is is because erasure coding relies upon a quorum of nodes to be available, and as the nodes in the net-
work become unavailable, achieving the necessary quorum becomes less likely. The advantages of erasure
coding, however, is that it uses less storage and increases security; but if the node’s availability is low, its
effectiveness as a data availability schema is significantly decreased.
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Figure 7: Difference between two availability models, shows that they converge as n increases. k = 7,
f = 10, ¯U = 0.1
4.2 SECURITY MODEL
Instead of modeling the security of the entire system, we model only the additional security provided by
SCAR. Because symmetrical encryption would be used on the raw data before SCAR is executed, any
security provided by SCAR is in addition to this encryption. Based upon this assumption, the model used
to evaluate SCAR’s security is the probability that an attacker could reassemble the scattered pieces. This
probability is based upon the the number of ways an attacker would have to arrange the pieces to be able to
obtain the original data. Knowing how many possible ways the attacker has to arrange the pieces gives us
an indication of how hard it would be for the attacker to get the stored data.
The number of combinations an attacker would have to test is dependent upon the amount of information
the attacker knows. An attacker needs three pieces of information to recover the data stored with SCAR.
First, the attacker needs to know many how pieces are needed for recovery (this is the k value). Then, the
attacker needs to find at least k of these pieces associated with the data in question. After having the k pieces,
the attacker must know how to order these pieces. The security provided by SCAR is based upon the fact
that the attacker could not easily obtain all three pieces of information.
For practicality reasons, the value of k must be bounded by some maximum value; hence bounding the
attackers search space. This maximum is referred to as maxk. SCAR chose 20 to be the value of maxk. This
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Figure 8: Comparison between replication and SCAR as the network nodes become increasingly unreliable.
security model assumes that the attacker does not know k, and must search for fragment groupings of size 1
to maxk.
Knowing where to find the k pieces is dependent upon the attackers perceived capacity of the network.
The perceived capacity represents how large the storage capacity of the network appears to the attacker. For
example, if the attacker has no information about where the data pieces are scattered, the perceived capacity
of the network is the size of the entire network. Clearly searching the entire network for a small subset of
pieces, requires that the attacker explores a large number of combinations. On the other hand, if the attacker
can monitor the network traffic, he has a smaller perceived capacity. This is because he can refine his search
space to a smaller subset of pieces accessed by the SCAR user. Also note that the value of k is bounded by
the perceived capacity.
Once k pieces are selected, the attacker must find the correct ordering of these pieces. The order is
important because IDA requires that the decoding matrix is built using the same properly ordered rows of
the encoding matrix. Recall that we use the same encoding matrix for each value of k and f . As a result,
this model assumes this encoding matrix is known to the attacker, but knowing the encoding matrix does not
allow the attacker to know the order of the data pieces.
These observations allow us to develop a model that describes the number of combinations the attacker
must check. The probability, Pc, that a given combination is the correct combination is defined by the
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following expression.
Pc =
1
∑min(c,maxk)i=1
(
c
i
)
i!
• c - the attackers perceived capacity of the network
• maxk - the maximum value of k (number of a pieces)
Consider the case where the attacker knows the total number of data pieces, f . By knowing f , the
attacker is effectively reducing the perceived capacity, c, of the network. This would be possible if the
attacker monitored the network traffic between the SCAR user and the DHT.
From this analysis, we can conclude that to ensure SCAR’s security, the attackers perceived capacity of
the network must be increased. One possible way to achieve this is to introduce fake data, thereby increasing
the data the attacker would have to check. This method would introduce data into the network that has no
value, and would be a very high price to pay for security. A more efficient method would be to batch data
accesses over time. This process would cause the data access of a data object A to overlap with the data
access of object B, again increasing the attackers perceived capacity. By doing this, we introduce storage
latency at the cost of increased security.
In order to determine the relationship between the perceived capacity and the value of k, we further
assume that the attacker knows k. In addition to simplifying our model, we believe that in practice the value
of k will be fixed or derived from a small range of values. Regardless of the size of the data being stored,
the number of pieces being generated (k) will be the same. This allows us to define the probability of an
attacker recovering the data from any given combination of pieces, as follows:
1(
c
k
)
k!
Considering Figure 9, observe that when k = 8, an increase in the perceived capacity causes the prob-
ability of a successful attack to decrease rapidly. By fixing k = 8, further consider the effect of perceived
capacity on security. Figure 10 shows the effect of varying the perceived capacity; even a small increase in
the capacity can cause a large increase in security.
Since increasing the perceived capacity is accomplished at a cost of either storage efficiency or latency
cost, there is a desire to bound this value. To analyze this, consider the amount of time it might take an
attacker to try each of the possibilities. We assume that each possibility would take 1 second to assemble
and test a set of fragments. Table 1 illustrates the effect that increasing the capacity has on the time it would
take to reassemble the pieces. The observation is with a value of k = 8 and a perceived capacity of 20, the
time to try all possible combinations makes it practically infeasible for an attacker to reassemble the data.
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It is therefore reasonable to select k = 8 and c = 20 in the analysis. This means that when we access data,
SCAR should interleave that data access within another data access, assuming n >= 10. This effectively
doubles the perceived capacity of the network, thus making c >= 20.
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Figure 9: Security model varying the networks perceived capacity,c, and k; f = 10, maxk = 20
4.3 TRADEOFF
Using availability and security models, the goal is to find the values of k and f which “optimize” both
availability and security. To accomplish this, both models must be integrated into a model that captures the
tradeoff between availability and security. The availability metric is used as it was presented previously. The
security metric, however, only reflects the probability of finding one given fragment combination. Because
of the scale difference in the availability and security probabilities we look at the probability of a security
failure within a given time frame, using the same computing power assumptions stated in the previous
section. For this analysis we use a 5 year time frame. This then allows the combination of the two metrics
into a single metric, called the tradeoff metric. The intuition is that users want to maximize both availability
and security. Using the tradeoff metric one can see directly the balance between availability and security, as
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Figure 10: Security model varying the networks perceived capacity (c); k = 8, f = 10, maxk = 20
it relates to the number of pieces generated and required ( f and k). We combine these two probabilities into
a weighted summation, thereby enabling the user to set the importance of security relative to availability.
Tradeo f f Metric = w1 ∗Availability Model +w2 ∗Probability O f Security Failure
In our analysis we assume that availability and security are equally important, and set the weights to
0.5. In Figure 11, we observe that the optimal value for k would be 8 when the value of f is set to 10 and
the node’s unavailability is 10%. Intuitively this makes sense: for maximum availability, a small number of
pieces are required, but for maximum security a large number of pieces should be required. The tradeoff
model shows that the balance point is not in the middle but shifted closer towards the total number of pieces
generated ( f ). In our case we have f = 10 and k = 8.
Using this model enabled us to determine a value for k for a fixed value of f = 10 and p = 0.10. This
model does not limit the value f , and we can observe in Figure 12 that by increasing f we can achieve better
performance. Because we are increasing the perceived capacity of the network by batching multiple data
accesses, increasing f also increases the perceived capacity. Using this model, we can see in Figure 13 that
by fixing k = 8, we can increase the metric significantly by adding one extra data fragment.
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capacity combinations calculation time
10 1.8144∗106 21 days
12 1.99584∗107 231 days
13 5.18918∗107 1.64548 years
15 2.59459∗108 8.2274 years
20 5.07911∗109 161.058 years
25 4.36091∗1010 1382.84 years
30 2.3599∗1011 7483.19 years
40 3.1008∗1012 98325.6 years
50 2.16469∗1011 686420.2 years
Table 1: Effect of increasing the perceived capacity of the network. k = 8, f = 10, maxk = 20
It is important to note that the values, k = 8 and f = 11, were determined by setting the average node
availability to ¯A = 0.90, or ¯U = 0.1. As the average node availability decreases, neither data security nor
availability can be achieved using SCAR. As the network becomes unstable, any availability scheme must
use multiple replicas of the data, causing data security to decrease. The tradeoff between availability and
security can only be balanced when the availability of the underlying network nodes are between 80% and
100%. Figure 14 depicts this behavior using our tradeoff metric. When the nodes are available 90% of the
time, there is a clear peak at k = 8, but once the node availability falls below 80% this peak becomes signifi-
cantly less. This further highlights the interplay between the contending goals, security through randomness
and availability through replication.
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Figure 11: Tradeoff model varying k; f = 10, maxk = 20, ¯U = 0.1
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Figure 12: Tradeoff model varying k and f ; maxk = 20, ¯U = 0.1
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Figure 13: Tradeoff model varying f ; k = 8, maxk = 20, ¯U = 0.1
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Figure 14: Tradeoff model varying ¯U ; f = 11
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5.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS
5.1 IMPLEMENTATION
SCAR was implemented as an application outside the DHT, and therefore is not bound to any specific DHT
implementation. To accomplish this, there is an interface layer between the generation of the storage bins
and the actual data accesses. Currently there is only two storage interfaces defined. One makes use of
OpenDHT’s web services API [23] and the other is a file system interface used for development. SCAR’s
architecture consists of 7 different components:
• Data Preprocessor - Encrypts raw data, generate data padding if necessary, prepends checksum and other
header information to the raw data.
• File Splitter - Splits a given file into k pieces.
• Encode - This transforms k into f encoded pieces, such that any k of those encoded pieces can be used
to recover the entire data object.
• Storage Bin Generation - This processes the f encoded pieces into storage bins which contain additional
header information.
• Storage Location Generator - Given identifying information generates a list of storage locations.
• Storage Manager - This component handles the request to store data. It accepts a list of storage bins
and determines how they will be stored (ie. batching transaction). This component is also capable of
retrieving data given a list of storage locations.
• Storage Interface - Interacts directly with the storage medium (ie. DHT, filesystem, etc).
• Decoder - Given k pieces of data, this process decodes the encoded data.
5.1.1 Details
SCAR was implemented using the Python programming language, and contains a command line interface.
This command line utility allows the user to specify a file to store in the DHT. Here, the user is prompted for
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a password, which is used to store the data in the DHT. The same command line can also be used to retrieve
data from the DHT by specifying a filename and revision, again prompting for a password. In addition,
values for f and k can be specified on the command line. Based upon the research presented in this thesis,
our default values are f = 11 and k = 8.
5.1.2 Encoding and Decoding
The implementation of an encoding and decoding process uses two basic matrix operations under a finite
prime field: multiplication and inversion. Once these two matrix operations are available, the next challenge
is to generate a linearly independent transformation matrix. To do this, SCAR makes use of the algorithm
listed in [17], and described in Algorithm 1.
The python language does not have native libraries for handling either matrix operations or finite fields.
In addition, the matrix libraries available made various assumptions about the mathematical properties of the
matrix contents making them difficult to use. Because of this, a custom matrix class was written which en-
abled finite field arithmetic, called FiniteFieldMatrix. To perform matrix inversion, this class uses Gaussian
reduction. One method of improving performance is to use a more efficient matrix inversion algorithm.
5.2 EXPERIMENTS
In addition to the implementation described in section 5.1, experiments were run using a DHT simulator
that replicated the properties of SCAR. In addition to emulating SCAR, the simulator also allows experi-
mentation with the properties of the network including the node’s availability, distribution of types of nodes,
and probability of data access. In the following section, we will describe the simulator used, compare the
theoretical models to simulations, analyze SCAR’s sensitivity to network changes, and compare SCAR’s
availability to that of replication.
5.2.1 Simulator
The simulator was built to allow quick spawning of multiple nodes. Each node is assigned a unique key
which was a MD5 hash value. This emulates the way nodes are created in a DHT. Next, f pieces of data
were stored at locations within the simulated DHT by using hash chains to determine the storage locations
of the data. The simulation of the hash chain process is the same used in the implementation. For each
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Algorithm 1 Create Encoding Matrix
1: f=total number of fragments
2: k=number of required pieces
3: Construct a (n− f )xk matrix A
4: for i = 0 to ( f − k) do
5: for j = 0 to k do
6: A[i][j]=(2 f−k+i) j
7: end for
8: end for
9: Construct a kxk matrix B
10: B[0][0]=1
11: for j = 0 to k−1 do
12: B[0][0]=0
13: end for
14: set B−1 to the inverse of B in GF
15: set C = A∗B−1, this is a (n− k)xk matrix
16: construct a f xk matrix
17: construct E with the first k rows being the identity matrix and the remaining ( f − k) rows being C
18: return E
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storage location, the node with the closest numerically matching id was selected to store the data. At any
point, the simulated network can be queried for a stored data object given the current network state. This
simulates the same erasure coding used in SCAR, and further allows the simulation of replication by setting
f = 2 and k = 1.
To simulate nodes ON and OFF behavior, nodes alternate between exiting and entering the network
based on their node type. This ON or OFF probability is based upon a distribution model specified, or can
be set to fixed probability. At each simulation step, all nodes are given the opportunity to change their current
state. Each node in the simulator is created as an independent object thus allowing the specification of any
node properties independently of the other nodes. This in turn allows us to simulate a network composed of
different types of nodes. During the simulations several standard network configurations were used, these
are listed in Table 2.
Infrastructure Power Users Peepers Average Node Availability
100% 0% 0% 98.39%
80% 10% 10% 86.78%
70% 20% 10% 83.44%
50% 30% 20% 71.66%
40% 30% 30% 63.36%
20% 30% 50% 46.70%
10% 20% 70% 33.41%
Table 2: Simulated average node availability for network configurations. Standard Deviation was less than
0.01%.
5.2.2 Data Availability
The goal of this experiment was to validate the theoretical models discussed in section 4. Using the simu-
lator, we created a network with homogeneous nodes, all with the same fixed node availability. Data was
inserted into the network using various values of f , k, n, and node availability. We compared the simula-
tion results with the results obtained using the analytical models. As can be seen in Figures 15 and 16, the
simulation results show that the analytical models offer accurate estimates of SCAR’s behavior.
In a few cases the experimentation resulted in two pieces of data being stored on one node, causing the
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data availability to be less than that predicted by the model. In the next experiment, we look at the likelihood
that a single node might be assigned two pieces of data from the original data object.
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Figure 15: Comparing Model and Experimental Results varying ¯U using f = 10, k = 7, n = 1000. Each
experimental point represents mean recovery rate of 1000 samples.
5.2.3 Node Collision
SCAR’s availability metric assumes that each piece of data is distributed to a unique node location. This
property is required because the metric assumes that data piece failures are independent from one another;
however, if two or more pieces of data were stored on the same node, those failures would no longer be
independent. To confirm our assumption, we simulated the storage of a 1000 data objects using SCAR and
monitored the network for node collisions within the same data object. The obvious observation is that as
the total number of nodes in the network increases, the probability of node collision decreases. Inversely, as
f increases the probability of a node collision increases. This can be seen in Figure 17.
As can be observed in Figure 18, the probability of node collisions are very low when using a reasonably
large network. In Figure 18 the value of f was fixed to 11 and the total number of nodes was varied to
determine how many collisions resulted. The simulation was run multiple times for all 1000 data objects
using randomly generated network nodes of the specified size. During each experiment the likelihood of a
node collision was calculated by looking at the number of actual collisions divided by the number of pieces
that didn’t result in a collision. To characterize the worst case behavior, Figure 18 shows the maximum ratio
of collisions to non-collisions observed for a network of the specified size.
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Figure 16: Comparing Model and Experimental Results varying ¯U using f = 7, k = 10, n = 1000. Each
experimental point represents mean recovery rate of 1000 samples.
5.2.4 Network Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we focus on SCAR’s sensitivity to network changes. In particular, we focus on the data
availability metric as the nodes in the network become less available. As mentioned in chapter 4, erasure
coding is only effective at increasing data availability when the nodes themselves are fairly reliable (∼ 80%).
To validate this assumption, we first define probabilities of nodes leaving and rejoining the network for the
three defined node types, see section 4.1.2. The simulation was executed using an exponential distribution
with mean probabilities set to the values listed in Table 3. The column labeled average node availability
is the measured average amount of time the nodes of that type were available across the lifetime of the
network. The variance in these numbers was less than 0.5 a percent; therefore, the variance is not listed.
The purpose of this experiment is to determine how SCAR performs as the network becomes unstable.
To simulate this behavior, we start with a network of only Infrastructure nodes and begin adding Peepers
to the network, thus increasing the instability of the network. The results are presented in Figure 19. This
indicates that when the average node availability is above 80%, the data availability is comparable with
replication; however when availability is below 80%, SCAR’s data availability becomes un-acceptable.
This is identical to the prediction made by our theoretical models, and confirms that SCAR is only effective
when the network is made of mostly available nodes.
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Figure 17: Average number of collisions varying number of fragments; n = 1000.
5.2.5 Likelihood of Recovery and Data Availability
During the analysis and experiments, we have seen that SCAR does not perform well when the nodes in the
network are unreliable. Observe that availability is dependent upon the user. When the user requests the
data it must be available, but that doesn’t mean the data has to be available at all time points. This reasoning
led us to investigate the way SCAR performs if data only needs to be available a fraction of the time. Instead
of verifying data availability at each time-point, we modified our simulation to check only a percentage of
the time. In Figure 20, it can be seen that varying the probability of data checking has no effect upon the
data availability. This is explainable because the overall availability would not be effected by the probability
of accessing data. Therefore, to solve the data availability problem, one must make the data available at all
times in order to increase the data availability for particular user.
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Figure 18: Maximum number of collisions to non-collisions varying number of nodes; f = 11.
type probability of leaving (α¯) probability of re-joining (¯β) ¯A
Infrastructure 1.0% 95.0% 98.0%
Power Users 20.0% 40.0% 65.0%
Peepers 80.0% 10.0% 15.0%
Table 3: Network Sensitivity Analysis Settings
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Figure 19: SCAR Simulation as network becomes unstable. Simulated by starting with a network of
1000 infrastructure nodes then adding peepers to the network, thereby making the network increasingly
un-available. Each data point represents the mean data availability of 10 objects over 200 simulation runs.
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Figure 20: Data Availability as probability of checking for data varies. Network configuration (80% Infras-
tructure; 10% Power Users, 10% Peepers). Each data point represents the mean data availability for 10 data
objects over 200 simulation runs.
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6.0 CONCLUSION
Peer-to-peer technologies promise to be a solution to the distributed storage problem, but current research
has failed to fully address the problem of distributed data security. This thesis presents a novel and elegant
solution that provides both data security and availability using peer-to-peer networks. The framework pre-
sented combines hash chaining, erasure coding, and distributed hash tables to create a complete solution to
a complex problem. A fully working implementation was developed thereby validating the protocols and
design discussed. In addition, this thesis provides an analysis of the proposed framework.
Analytical models were developed to model SCAR’s security and availability characteristics. The anal-
ysis of these models showed us that the erasure coding techniques used by SCAR were only effective when
the peer-to-peer node’s availability is sufficiently high, > 80%. This was a disappointment, however, this
thesis has provided the framework for evaluating new availability schemes. This work further emphasized
the tradeoff between availability and security.
6.1 FUTURE WORK
This thesis provides a complete prototype and provides a platform for exploring other issues in using DHT’s
to provide distributed storage. One of the metrics needing further study is how SCAR’s design effects system
latency. The hypothesis is that SCAR will not hurt, and might even decrease system latency. This is because
reading and writing data pieces using SCAR can be done in parallel.
Increasing an attackers perceived capacity, as described in section 4.2, needs more investigation. The
goal here is to find other methods besides batching that will improve security, while not introducing access
latency.
Using the SCAR framework to store user profile information promises to be a solution to a privacy
concerns of millions of web users. One potential solution is to develop a web browser extension that allow
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users to securely store their bookmarks, preferences, and saved passwords. The motivation is to enable
secure data storage that is not controlled by a single organization and is only accessible to the information
owner.
Another potential application is to store digital photos, which led to the idea of allowing multiple entry
points into the data. The idea would modify the hash chain to allowing multiple data entry points. For
instance, one staring hash value could be used to access a lower resolution image while another value is
used for accessing high resolution images. If this could be accomplished using the same hash sequence, the
data overlap could reduce the amount of redundant data being stored.
In both the analysis and simulations, we observed that as the average node availability goes down, the
effectiveness of SCAR also decreases. There are two options for using SCAR: build a network with high
node availability or select storage nodes based upon their availability. The selection process would require
knowledge of the node’s availability, and therefore require changes to the underlying DHT. Future work
could look at what changes need to be made within the underlying DHT to improve SCAR’s availability and
security.
6.2 SUMMARY
This thesis presents a method for using peer-to-peer networks to securely and reliably store data using a
novel combination of erasure coding and hash chaining. This thesis also provides implementation details
based upon the prototype that was developed showing the feasibility of SCAR. Beyond developing SCAR,
this thesis provides an analysis of the inherent tradeoff between security and availability. The exploration
of this tradeoff lead to the conclusion that SCAR can effectively balance this tradeoff when the nodes of the
network are sufficiently available.
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